volition

Etymology

From French volition, from Medieval Latin volitiō (“will, volition”), from Latin volō (“to wish; to want; to mean or intend”) (ultimately from Proto-Indo-European *welh₁- (“to choose; to want”)) + -tiō (“suffix forming nouns relating to some action or the result of an action”) (ultimately from Proto-Indo-European *-tis (“suffix forming abstract or action nouns from verbs”)).

noun

1. A conscious choice or decision.
   […] And as the Understanding doth at once apprehend it as Good Abſolutely, or in ſome Reſpect, and Evil in other reſpects, and Comparatively a Leſs Good; ſo doth the Will at once continue to Love or Will it ſo farre as it is Apprehended as Good, and to Nill and Reject it as inconſiſtent with a Greater Good, or a hinderer of it. But if it fall out that the Inconſiſtency of theſe is not diſcerned or believed, or but Imperfectly, then may the Will by a Practical Volition Will them both. 1655, Richard Baxter, “An Addition to the 11th Chapter of the 3d Part of the Saints Rest”, in Rich: Baxter’s Confesssion of His Faith, Especially Concerning the Interest of Repentance and Sincere Obedience to Christ, in Our Justification & Salvation. VVritten for the Satisfaction of the Misinformed, the Conviction of Calumniators, and the Explication and Vindication of Some Weighty Truths, London: Printed by R[obert] W[hite] for Tho[mas] Underhil, and Fra[ncis] Tyton, and are to be sold at the Anchor and Bible in Pauls Church-yard, and at the Three Daggers in Fleetstreet, →OCLC
   [Antonio] Conte has broken the mould further with the suggestion he might escape the [Roman] Abramovich cleaver, becoming the first of his line to leave by his own volition. 13 May 2017, Barney Ronay, “Antonio Conte’s brilliance has turned Chelsea’s pop-up team into champions”, in The Guardian, London, archived from the original on 2017-09-09
2. The mental power or ability of choosing; the will.
   Out of all the factors that can influence a person’s decision, none can match the power of his or her own volition.
   The volition may be in accordance with the desire or not; it may be in accordance with the moral feelings, and wholly at variance with the desires; but in both alike the desires and volitions are distinct. 1841, Thomas C[ogswell] Upham, “Distinction between Desires and Volitions”, in A Philosophical and Practical Treatise on the Will. Forming the Third Volume of a System of Mental Philosophy, New York, N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 82 Cliff-Street, →OCLC, § 54 (Volition may Exist in Respect to those Complex Acts which the Mind Can Embrace as One), page 104
3. (linguistics) A concept that distinguishes whether or not the subject or agent intended something.
   English has not one FOR TO construction but several. These several constructions are interrelated and form a chain, or rather a family, of constructions, with identical or similar components recurring in more or less similar configurations. […] The composition of this family can be represented as follows: (1) Personal volition (e.g. I want very much for Peter to be present.) (2) Volition expressed in directives (e.g. He gave orders for his family to be summoned.) (3) Impersonal (unspecified) volition (e.g. It is necessary for Peter to be present.) […] 1988, Anna Wierzbicka, “FOR TO versus TO”, in The Semantics of Grammar (Studies in Language Companion Series; 18), Amsterdam, Philadelphia, Pa.: John Benjamins Publishing Company, →ISSN, pages 126–127